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The Economics of 
Nuclear Energy
While few people now believe that nuclear power would provide ‘power 
too cheap to meter’, there is still a common perception that nuclear power 
is a cheap source of electricity. The fact that nuclear power has not come 
to dominate electricity generation is seen as being due to a combination 
of public opposition and dealing with the safety issues raised by 
accidents such as those at Three Mile Island (1978), Chernobyl (1986) 
and Fukushima (2011). The reality is that nuclear power has seldom 
been the cheapest option for new power stations. Worse, the real cost of 
any normal successful technology goes down over time due to the effect 
of intuitively sensible factors such as ‘learning-by-doing’, economies of 
scale and general technical progress. For nuclear power, these factors 
do not seem to have worked and for its entire commercial history, the 
real cost of nuclear power has only ever gone upwards. The Fukushima 
disaster can only give a further twist to this upward spiral. This paper 
examines the determinants of the cost of a kilowatt hour (kWh) of 
nuclear electricity; what the latest designs of nuclear power plant can 
offer; how new nuclear plants might be financed; and what issues will 
determine whether South Africa can successfully launch a new nuclear 
programme.
What Determines the Cost of Nuclear Power?1
Carrying out a detailed cost estimate for the cost of a kWh of nuclear electricity 
is a major exercise requiring the estimation of a large number of variables many of 
which are not easy to forecast. However, it is relatively easy to get an approximate 
idea of the cost of nuclear power because the costs are expected to be dominated 
by the ‘fixed’ costs associated with the construction of the plant. As a rule of 
thumb, it can be assumed that these fixed costs account for about two thirds of 
the cost of a kWh of nuclear electricity. So, to determine whether nuclear power 
is competitive, we can concentrate on the variables that determine these fixed 
costs. The variables can be divided into three: the major determinants of the cost 
of a kWh (they set the fixed costs); less important determinants; and those that 
have little impact.
Major Determinants
•	 The	construction	cost: As nuclear power plants are supplied by an international 
market, this is usually estimated in dollars and to allow fair comparison between 
different size plants the cost is usually quoted in dollars per kilowatt of installed 
capacity ($/kW). To avoid distortions because the cost of borrowing will vary 
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according to the specifics of the plant, the cost is quoted, where possible as if 
the plant was built ‘overnight’ with no cost of borrowing.
•	 The	cost	of	capital: If the company borrows half the money from the market at, 
say, a real rate of interest (net of inflation) of 8% and finances the rest from its 
own resources at, say 12%, the average cost of capital is 10%.
•	 The	plant	load	factor: Because the cost of nuclear power is dominated by the 
upfront costs, which have to be paid whether or not the plant is operating, it 
makes sense to run a nuclear plant at its maximum level for as long as possible 
so that these fixed costs can be spread out over as many kWh as possible. 
The annual load factor is calculated as the number of kWh it produces, as a 
percentage of the power it would have produced, if it had operated at full power 
uninterrupted for the entire year.
A highly skilled site labour force is required 
and if this is not available locally, extra costs 
will be incurred. Other factors include: the 
cost of building the transmission links needed 
to connect the station to the national grid; the 
local geology and seismology; and the method 
of cooling.
Less Important Determinants
•	 Site-specific	costs: A relatively small proportion 
of the cost of a nuclear power plant is covered by 
the major items of factory produced equipment. 
The main costs are incurred at the site and 
include installation, pouring of concrete. There is 
therefore significant scope for costs of the same 
design of reactor to vary from site to site. A highly 
skilled site labour force is required and if this is 
not available locally, extra costs will be incurred. 
Other factors include: the cost of building the 
transmission links needed to connect the station to the national grid; the local 
geology and seismology; and the method of cooling.
•	 Non-fuel	 operating	 cost:	 The cost of operating the plant, including 
maintenance, repair and staffing is relatively low, typically 20% of the total 
cost, but not negligible. These costs are not completely fixed – if the plant is 
permanently closed, they are no longer incurred – but they are relatively fixed 
while the plant is in service. Some nuclear plants that have required a large 
amount of maintenance and repairs have been closed because these costs were 
prohibitive.
•	 Cost	 of	 fuel: Unlike power plants using coal or gas, the cost of fuel is low, 
typically 5% including the cost of raw uranium, the cost of turning it into fuel 
and the cost of disposal after it has been used.
Those with Little Impact
•	 Decommissioning	cost: The cost of decommissioning a nuclear plant, cleaning 
up the site and disposing of the radioactive materials (excluding the fuel) – the 
structure of the plant will become increasingly radioactive over its life – is of 
the same order of magnitude as the construction cost, but in a normal project 
appraisal, costs and benefits arising long into the future have much less weight 
than earlier costs.
•	 Insurance cost: By international treaty or national law, the liability in the event 
of an accident of a company owning a nuclear plant is capped at a level far 
51
the economics of nuclear energy
We have to assume we can forecast accurately 
what the cost of a process will be that has 
not been done yet (spent fuel disposal) 
or not yet done on a commercial scale 
(decommissioning) 100 or more years in the 
future. 
below the potential damage cost. The sum varies from country to country, but, 
typically, a utility would only be liable for damages up to $200m, with any 
other costs borne by the country (taxpayers). The company selling the nuclear 
plant cannot be held responsible for any damages resulting from an accident.
The Public Perspective
The costs described above are as perceived by the company which will own and 
operate the plant. However, from a societal point of view, the perspective is different 
because taxpayers ultimately must bear the risks. Some costs, such as insurance 
costs, are potentially huge: costs from Chernobyl and Fukushima are likely to run 
into hundreds of billions of dollars. Without the guarantee that accident costs 
would fall on the taxpayer, it is unlikely that many, if any nuclear plants would 
have been built. Costs far into the future are ‘discounted’ away in conventional 
accounting.1 In typical project appraisal processes, the value of future liabilities 
is calculated as the sum of money that would be needed if it was invested today 
and earned interest till the money was needed-the discounted value. Over a short 
period of time, this is intuitively sensible. If you have a liability of $100 to be 
paid in a year and you can earn 3% real interest, a 
sum of $97 invested today would grow sufficiently to 
pay the required cost. However, over longer periods, 
this causes some alarming results. If we assume 
decommissioning costs $1bn and is expected to be 
carried out 100 years after the start-up of the plant 
and money can be invested to earn 3% interest, a sum 
of only $50m is needed. If the period is 150 years-
the timescale planned for the UK’s nuclear power 
plants- the sum required today is only $12m. Similar 
considerations apply to the disposal of spent fuel.
These are not liabilities like repaying a lender. A future generation will have no 
option but to try to decommission the plants and dispose of the spent fuel. Over 
such a long period, the assumptions behind the conventional accounting method 
are hard to justify. We have to assume we can forecast accurately what the cost 
of a process will be that has not been done yet (spent fuel disposal) or not yet 
done on a commercial scale (decommissioning) 100 or more years in the future. 
We then have to assume that we can invest a sum of money in investments with 
negligible risk of failure at an assured rate of interest over 100 years. The current 
financial crisis should have alerted everyone that such assumptions are implausible. 
If the funding method fails or delivers much less money than is needed, a future 
generation will not only have to carry out these hazardous tasks but it will have to 
fund them from their own resources.
Fuel is also an important issue. It is unlikely that the price of uranium, which 
probably represents less than 1% of the cost of a kWh of nuclear electricity, will 
go up to a level at which it would have a significant impact on overall nuclear 
economics. However, if the price of uranium were to go up, say, 5-fold, this would 
imply the need to mine poor quality ore. Mining uranium produces large quantities 
of hazardous (radioactive) waste, which must be carefully dealt with if it is not to 
contaminate water sources and cause serious health issues. The poorer the quality 
of ore, the more waste will be produced to get each kilogram of uranium.
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The Latest Designs of Nuclear Plants
Nuclear power plants are usually categorised according to the coolant used-the 
fluid that takes the heat from the reactor core to the turbine generator where 
the electricity is generated-and by the moderator - the material that is used 
to maximise the chances that when an atom splits, the particle emitted causes 
another fission. More than 90% of reactors installed worldwide use water as 
coolant and moderator, either as a Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) or a Boiling 
Water Reactor (BWR). The two reactors at Koeberg are of the PWR type. The 
Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) that South Africa tried to develop from 
1998-2010 would have used helium gas as coolant and graphite as moderator.
After the Chernobyl disaster, a combination of 
poor economics and public concern meant that 
nuclear power plant ordering reached a low ebb. For 
example, in Europe and North America, no nuclear 
orders were placed in the 1990s. Nuclear designers 
attempted to meet this challenge by producing a 
new generation of nuclear power plant designs, still 
using water as coolant and moderator, which offered 
improved safety and economics. These became 
known as Generation III+ designs2 and optimism in 
the nuclear industry about their attractiveness was 
so high that it claimed a ‘Nuclear Renaissance’ would occur. Under this, countries 
such as USA, UK, Germany and Italy, which seemed to have turned away from 
nuclear power, would start ordering large numbers of reactors.3
The two designs with the best commercial prospects and which are closest to 
deployment are the French European Pressurised Water Reactor (EPR) supplied 
by Areva and the AP1000, a PWR supplied by the Toshiba-owned company, 
Westinghouse.
The first government to be convinced by their merits was the US which, in 2002, 
launched its Nuclear 2010 programme, under which it was expected that one or 
more of these designs would be in service by 2010. It summarised the expected 
advantages of the Generation III+ designs as follows4:
‘New Generation III+ designs have the advantage of combining technology 
familiar to operators of current plants with vastly improved safety features and 
significant simplification is expected to result in lower and more predictable 
construction and operating costs.’
The nuclear industry predicted that these designs could be built for an overnight 
cost of $1000/kW so that a typical reactor with a capacity of 1,000,000kW 
(1000MW) would cost $1bn. The promises for these designs have proved well 
wide of the mark and the latest cost estimates are about 5-6 times this level. Only 
eight reactors using Generation III+ designs have been ordered and six of these are 
in China and have only started construction in the past couple of years so there is 
little to be learnt from these. 
Construction of the two plants in the West, both EPRs, one in Finland and one 
in France, has gone badly wrong. Both are now forecast to take at least five years 
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longer to build than the 4-5 years expected and their final cost is at least double 
the forecast level. Far from being simpler, these are now seen as more complex 
than their predecessors and this has contributed to the problems of controlling 
construction cost and time.5 It seems likely that two orders for AP1000s will go 
ahead in the USA, the first plants ordered under the US Nuclear 2010 programme. 
These are unlikely to enter service before 2017-18, more than seven years later 
than originally envisaged.
Finance
One of the main hurdles for any nuclear project has 
been to convince financiers to lend the money to 
nuclear projects. The record of nuclear plants being 
built-to time and cost-and operating reliably is poor 
and recent experience in France and Finland has 
reinforced this poor reputation. In the past, these 
economic risks did not matter to financiers in most 
markets because in a monopoly electricity market, 
consumers usually pay whatever costs are incurred, 
so the risk falls on consumers not the financiers. 
However, electricity markets have increasingly been 
opened to competition and, in a market, expensive 
producers go bankrupt and the banks that lent them money lose it. Even where 
monopoly remains, consumers are increasingly unwilling to sign a ‘blank cheque’ 
to power plant developers and when a nuclear project goes wrong, the company 
that owns the plant may be forced to take the hit potentially bankrupting it and 
jeopardising the banks’ loans to it.
Where nuclear projects are going ahead in the West, invariably there is high 
confidence that consumers will meet whatever costs are incurred. One alternative 
to passing the risk to consumers is for the government of the vendor to offer 
sovereign loan guarantees. This means that if the project goes wrong and the 
utility building the plant cannot repay the loan, taxpayers would repay the banks. 
However, this option has disadvantages, especially to the utility’s consumers. If 
the utility is bankrupted, taxpayers from the vendor’s home country will step in 
to repay the bank, but the consumers of the utility will still have to bail out a 
bankrupt utility.
Prospects for Nuclear Power in South Africa
Since 1998, the South African government and Eskom have pursued nuclear 
power with enthusiasm, but no success. From 1998-2010, there was a programme 
to try to bring the PBMR design to commerciality. This attempt failed, costing 
around R10bn, mostly of South African public money.6 By 2006, Eskom was 
beginning to look at alternative options to the failing PBMR programme and 
in January 2008, it launched a tender calling for 3200-3600MW of new capacity 
from Areva NP and Toshiba/Westinghouse for 3200-3600MW of capacity.7 In 
2007, Eskom was expecting bids of about $2500/kW.8 It was reported that the 
bids were actually in the order US$6000/kW9 and in November 2008, Areva 
was reported to have won the contest.10 However, in December 2008, Eskom 
cancelled the tender citing ‘the magnitude of the investment.’11 Engineering News 
reported that the issue was the credit rating of Eskom12:
Even where monopoly remains, consumers 
are increasingly unwilling to sign a ‘blank 
cheque’ to power plant developers and when a 
nuclear project goes wrong, the company that 
owns the plant may be forced to take the hit 
potentially bankrupting it and jeopardising 
the banks’ loans to it.
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“... ratings agency Standard & Poor’s said on Thursday that South Africa’s National Treasury needed to 
extend “unconditional, timely guarantees” across all Eskom’s debt stock if it hoped to sustain the utility’s 
current BBB+ investment-grade credit rating. The National Treasury was still to announce the details of 
the package. The Eskom board had, as a result, decided to terminate the commercial procurement process 
to select the preferred bidder for the construction of the Nuclear-1 project.”
Far from being deterred by this experience, Eskom has cast its net wider to include earlier generation designs, 
on the assumption they would be cheaper. This is expected to bring in reactors from China and Korea. Ironically, 
the design offered by China, the CPR1000, is effectively an updated version of the design built at Koeberg 
in the 1980s. This design dates back to the late 1960s. The Korean design is a little newer and is based on a 
US design from the 1990s. It is expected a formal call for tenders will be launched in 2012 for 9600MW of 
capacity. The government is expecting bids of about $4000/kW.13 It is hard to understand why the government 
assumes the cost this time will be only two thirds of the level from four years ago, and how it will be possible 
to finance 9600MW when it proved impossible to finance 3600MW then.
Conclusions
Nuclear power is an expensive way to generate electricity and even after more than 50 years of commercial 
development, there is no sign that costs are going to stop increasing. In addition, it is an economically highly 
risky option because of the poor record of plants being built-to time and cost-and operating as reliably as 
forecast. The Fukushima disaster serves to underline the problems the nuclear industry was already facing. A 
new generation of nuclear designs appears close to failure because it is failing to deliver the promises made for 
it: that they would be safer and because they were simpler, they would be cheaper and easier to build than their 
predecessors. The Fukushima disaster can only serve to increase their costs and probably their complexity and 
delay further the time they are commercially available to order.
If it is going to be feasible for new nuclear plants to be financed, it will only be if electricity consumers bear 
these economic risks, as has always been the case in the past. This economic risk is in addition to the financial 
risks that the public has always had to bear. These risks arise from the possibility of a catastrophic nuclear 
accident and the need to dispose of the spent fuel and other radioactive waste and decommission the reactor 
returning the site to a state where it can be released for unrestricted use.
For South Africa, the latest attempt to place orders for new nuclear plants is not likely to be any more successful 
than previous attempts. This will waste some public money, but the bigger problem is that for several more 
years, the government and Eskom will continue to act on the basis that nuclear power can meet its electricity 
objectives. The options that are capable of meeting these objectives will continue to be neglected.
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